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Pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court, plaintiffs and appellees, First Security Bank ("FSB") and
First Security Financial ("FSF"), respectfully respond to Eugene
L. Kimball's Petition for Rehearing with respect to this Court's
opinion and decision filed on January 2, 1990.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE SIX "UNUSUAL PROVISIONS" OF THE PURCHASE
AGREEMENT, EVEN AS MISCHARACTERIZED AND
OVERSTATED BY KIMBALL, DO NOT CREATE A DUTY
OF DISCLOSURE.
Kimball

petitions

the

Court

for

rehearing

on

the

grounds that the Purchase Agreement between FSB, FSF and the
Horman Family Trust contains six "unusual provisions."

These

"unusual provisions," argues Kimball, somehow give rise to a duty
of disclosure.
reasons.

First,

Kimball's argument is unpersuasive for several
Kimball's

characterization

of

the

"unusual

provisions" at pages 3 and 4 of the Petition for Rehearing is
unsupported by the record.
Kimball

Second, the provisions

are not at all unusual, and

their

cited by

inclusion

in the

Purchase Agreement does not erect some special duty of disclosure.

Third, a duty to disclose, as pointed out by the Court in

its majority opinion, is primarily a function of the relationship
between the parties.

In this case the relationship is between

junior and senior lienholders.

A duty to disclose the purchase

of a senior lien to a junior lienholder, if it does not already
exist, is not created as a result of the language employed in the

purchase agreement between a senior lienholder and a third-party
purchaser.
A.

Kimball's Characterization of the Purchase Agree-

ment is Unsupported by the Record.
The

inclusion

of

what

Kimball

terms

some

"unusual

provisions" in the Purchase Agreement is insufficient to warrant
a rehearing

in this matter.

Each of the "unusual provisions"

identified by Kimball is addressed below.
1.
October

1984

Agreement,

Confidentiality

Settlement

were subject

Provision.

Agreements,

including

to a confidentiality

provisions are neither unusual nor uncommon.
ality

provisions

commercial
common

and

agreements

transactions

element

are

transactions

is the

recognize

or

improper

that most

about

transactions

Purchase
Such

in many

complex

Similarly, a

allocation

of

the

There is nothing unlaw-

such

have

the

Indeed, confidenti-

between private parties.

of most

subversive

the

provision.

standard

various risks associated with the deal.
ful,

Admittedly,

measures;

some

they

inherent

simply

risks

and

the

legitimate reasons for confidentiality.
Contrary
Petition

for

to

Kimball's

Rehearing,

the

assertion

banks'

at

page

3

of

lawyers,

Ray,

Quinney

&

Nebeker, not only knew the basis for the Purchase Agreement, but
they participated in its drafting and advised the banks as to the
agreement's legality.

(See citations to the Record at pp. 10-14
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of FSB's Brief on appeal).

The lawyers retained by Commonwealth

Land Title Company to defend the banks' priority positions under
the title policy were informed that a multi-faceted settlement
had occurred.

(id.)

In addition, dismissal papers were filed

with the court and served on all parties of record.
The mere

fact

the parties decided

(Id. )

to preserve the

confidentiality of an agreement does not give rise to a duty to
disclose the very thing intended to be kept confidential.
2.

Normal Business Transaction.

Kimball appar-

ently takes the position that since the Purchase Agreement was
consummated during
transaction."
the

threat

litigation, it was not a "normal business

(Petition for Rehearing at p. 3.)

thereof,

is often the catalyst

Litigation, or

for

a particular

business transaction, a restructuring, settlement, purchase or
other resolution of the problem.

There is nothing in the Court's

detailed analysis to suggest that merely because parties may be
in some phase of litigation or have unresolved disputes between
them, that a duty is thereby created to disclose to the public
the details of the resolution of those differences.
Kimball's

statement

at page

3 of

the Petition

for

Rehearing that "the defendants did not even make the existence of
an agreement known to the court" is false and unsupported by the
record.
ment

Immediately upon execution of the October 1984 Settle-

Agreements,

including

the Purchase Agreement, the banks

-3-

caused a notice to be filed with the court and served on the
parties.

(See citations to the Record at pp. 11-18 of FSB's

Brief on appeal).

Discovery requests were then immediately filed

by other parties to the action seeking disclosure of the agreements.

The banks offered to have the court examine the Purchase

Agreement and the other documents jji camera in accordance with
the discovery process.

When finally ordered

documents, the banks immediately did so.

{Id.)

to produce the
Such a sequence

is not at all "unusual," but is rather commonplace when parties
are trying to preserve the confidentiality of certain documents.
3.

False Statements of Consideration - Kimball

apparently maintains that a party's choice of consideration may
give rise to a duty to disclose.

Neither FSB nor FSF admitted

the certificate of deposit was "a false step without business
purpose
at p.3).

. . ."as alleged by Kimball.

(Petition for Rehearing

The record simply reflects that the banks did not have

a preference between cash or an
certificate

of

deposit.

The

irrevocable assignment

certificate

of

deposit

of a
simply

provided a convenient mechanism whereby interest could be paid
back to the Horman Family Trust during the first year of the
certificate

or until

occurred first.

resolution

of the

litigation, whichever

Interestingly, if the parties intended the use

of the certificate of deposit to prevent the transaction from
being considered a "payment" as admitted by Kimball, (Petition
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for Rehearing at p. 3), that serves only to substantiate the
position taken by the bank and Horman that the liens were purchased not paid.
A duty to disclose cannot be deemed to exist based
simply on whether the parties utilized cash, checks, certificates
of deposit or some other medium as a consideration for a deal,
4.

Disguised

Transaction

-

Kimball

cites

no

authority to support his assertion that the parties attempted to
disguise the transaction as something it was not.

The Purchase

Agreement clearly and unambiguously describes the nature of the
deal.

The Court summarized the essence of the transaction at

page 3 of its Opinion.

The Purchase Agreement merely took into

account the possible outcomes of the then pending foreclosure
proceeding.

Because the outcome of the foreclosure action was

still undetermined, the Purchase Agreement of necessity had to be
a contingent agreement.
5.
determined

priority

Recordation of Instruments - Until the Court
or the Horman Family Trust

exercised

an

option under the Purchase Agreement, no recordable event had
occurred.
6.

Allocation of Risks - Allocation of risk is a

perfectly reasonable and prudent component of business transactions.

As with the other "unusual provisions" identified by

Kimball, allocation of risk between the Horman Family Trust and
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the banks did not impair or alter the relationship or duties owed
to Kimball as the junior lienholder.

Allocation of risk of loss

for whatever reason between a senior lienholder and a third-party
purchaser is not a factor which would typically create a duty of
disclosure owed to a junior lienholder.
The

jury

obviously

arguments at trial that these

was

not

convinced

by

Kimball's

"unusual provisions" were evidence

that FSB And FSF had engaged in "wrongful conduct,"

(Petition

for Rehearing at p. 4). The jury verdict vindicating FSB and FSF
of

any wrongful conduct so manifests.

In view of

the jury

verdict in favor of the banks, this Court must view the facts in
the light most favorable to FSB and FSF, a consideration Kimball
has obviously ignored in characterizing the provisions discussed
above as "badges of fraud."
Consideration

of

the

factual

"omissions"

raised

by

Kimball is more properly deferred to the question of breach, an
inquiry that occurs only after a duty is found to exist.

Even

then, the factual "omissions" would have to be viewed with due
difference being given to the jury verdict in favor of FSB and
FSF,

something

Kimball

has

not

Rehearing.
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done

in

his

Petition

for

B.

The Legal Analysis Employed by the Court Applies

To This Case,
Kimball does not attack
Courtf

only

its application

of

the legal analysis of this
that

analysis

to

the facts,

Kimball attempts to illustrate this point with two examples.
first example

is a typical situation

first mortgage by a third party.

The

involving purchase of a

Kimball agrees that no duty to

disclose the purchase to the junior lienholder exists in this
scenario.
The second example cited by Kimball is a badly flawed
attempt

to depict

the situation

in this case.

erroneously states that the third party —

The example

T, or in this case the

Horman Family Trust, agreed to purchase the first lienholder1s
rights or pay the

debtor's obligation.

The Purchase Agreement

contemplated only an option to purchase of the banks1 bundle of
rights

in the mortgage.

The Purchase Agreement

provision for payment of the liens.

contains no

Additionally, the record

does not support Kimball's assertion that the Purchase Agreement
contains requirements that the "purchase be kept secret until
such time as [Kimball] loses any rights he may have to claim an
interest in the property."

(Petition for Rehearing at p. 6).

Indeed, the Purchase Agreement contemplated and allowed for the
possibility that Kimball would be successful on his equitable
arguments regarding priority and be elevated to a first position.
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This was the contingent nature of the agreement.

It contemplated

and provided for the possibility that Kimball would be in first
position.
Kimball's first example, the normal third-party purchase of a senior lienr with a slight modification to take into
account the fact that the purchase took place during the course
of

litigation, reflects what actually occurred

This distinction

simply

required

that

in this case.

the Purchase Agreement

contain some contingencies to account for the possible outcomes
of the foreclosure proceeding.

As pointed out by the Court in

its majority opinion, the Purchase Agreement basically provided
that the third-party purchaser, the Horman Family Trust, had the
option of purchasing the senior lienholders' rights.
Kimball fails to articulate any reasons why a greater
duty of disclosure should attach when the purchase occurs during
litigation or is contingent in nature.
of a mortgagor

leaves

A purchase of the rights

intact the lien priorities, rights and

remedies as between junior and senior lienholders.
Adoption of Kimball's argument would mean that a duty
to disclose is created whenever a senior lien is purchased and a
junior lienholder screams "payment."

Such a result would place

an unbearable burden of the mortgage industry and give rise to
pointless litigation.
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II.

BANBERRY HAD STANDING TO APPEAL THE "PAYMENT"
FINDING.
Kimball's second main point in his Petition for Rehear-

ing is that the "payment" versus "purchase" issue was not properly before this Court on appeal.
ing

that

neither

finding.
party

the

banks

Kimball is correct in assert-

not

Kimball

appealed

the

payment

It is also true the Horman Family Trust was never a

to

this

Kimball.

action,

However,

the

same

never

as the Court

having

correctly

been

pointed

joined
out

by

in its

opinion, not only was the jury instruction on payment flawed, but
the special verdict

form erroneously asked whether Banberry had

paid the banks' liens.

(Opinion at p. 21.)

party to the Purchase Agreement.

Banberry was not a

Thus, there is specific jury

finding which Banberry apparently believed was erroneous.
The unappealed

finding

that Horman was not

the alter

ego of the Horman Family Trust is critical in this regard since
the Trust, and not Banberry, was the purchaser under the Purchase
Agreement.

Banberry

cannot

be

stripped

of

its

standing

to

challenge an erroneous jury instruction and verdict form simply
because

Kimball

views

the

erroneous

finding

as

favorable

to

Banberry.

1

However, the issue of "payment" v. "purchase" was indirectly
raised on appeal by Kimball as an integral part of its
cross-appeal on the conspiracy issue. Thus, Kimball put the payment finding in issue.
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Banberry specifically preserved the issue of "purchase"
versus "payment" on appeal and the issue was properly before the
Court.
CONCLUSION
Kimball has failed to articulate any persuasive reasons
as to why the Court should grant a rehearing in this matter.

For

the reasons articulated herein, FSB and FSF respectfully request

of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for First Security Bank
and First Security Financial

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

/
day of February,

1990, I served the Response to Petition for Rehearing by mailing
four copies of the same, postage prepaid, to the following:
Robert S. Campbell, Jr.
E. Barney Gesas
Tracy H. Fowler
CAMPBALL, MAACK AND SESSIONS
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for appellants Horman, et al.
Arthur H. Nielsen
NIELSEN AND SENIOR
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
-10-

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Michael R. Carlston
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Craig S. Cook
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorneys for respondent and
cross-appellant Kimball

'?&"&
202:022290A

-11-

